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Abstract 
This paper describes the PERMIS role based access control infrastructure that uses 
X.509 attribute certificates (ACs) to store the users’ roles. Users’ roles can be 
assigned by multiple widely distributed management authorities (called Attribute 
Authorities in X.509), thereby easing the burden of management. All the ACs can be 
stored in one or more LDAP directories, thus making them widely available. The 
PERMIS distribution includes a Privilege Allocator GUI tool, and a bulk loader tool, 
that allow administrators to construct and sign ACs and store them in an LDAP 
directory ready for use by the PERMIS decision engine. All access control decisions 
are driven by an authorization policy, which is itself stored in an X.509 AC, thus 
guaranteeing its integrity and trustworthiness. Authorization policies are written in 
XML according to a DTD that has been published at XML.org. A user friendly policy 
management tool is also being built that will allow non-technical managers to easily 
specify PERMIS authorisation policies. The access control decision engine is written 
in Java and has both a Java API and SAML-SOAP interface, allowing it to be called 
either locally or remotely. The Java API is simple to use, comprising of just 3 
methods and a constructor. The SAML-SOAP interface conforms to the OASIS 
SAMLv1.1 specification, as profiled by a Global Grid Forum draft standard, thus 
making PERMIS suitable as an authorisation server for Grid applications.  
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Introduction to X.509 PMIs 
Most people familiar with PKIs will know that the standard format for a public key 
certificate is specified in the X.509 standard [14], published jointly by the ITU-T and 
ISO/IEC. The primary purpose of a PKI is to strongly authenticate the parties 
communicating with each other, though the use of digital signatures. But strong 
authentication on its own is insufficient for a process to determine who is allowed to 
do what. An authorisation mechanism is needed for this. Edition 4 of X.509 is the first 
edition of X.509 to fully standardise a strong authorisation mechanism, which it calls 
a Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI). PMIs provide the authorisation 
function after the authentication has taken place, and have a number of similarities 
with PKIs. This paper assumes the reader is already familiar with the general concepts 
of PKIs, and these will not be repeated here. Readers wishing to learn more about 
PKIs may consult texts such as [1] or [12]. 
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Signed by attribute authority 
Attribute Certificate Information 
Embedded Attribute(s) 
Figure 1 Attribute Certificate 
The primary data structure in a 
PMI is an X.509 Attribute 
Certificate  (AC) (see Figure 1.)  
This strongly binds a set of 
attributes to its holder, and these 
attributes are used to describe the 
various privileges of the holder 
bestowed on it by the issuer. The 
issuer is termed an Attribute 
Authority (AA), since it is the 
authoritative provider of the 
attributes given to the holder. 
Examples of attributes and issuers 
might be: a degree awarded by a university, an ISO 9000 certificate issued by a QA 
compliance organisation, the role of supervisor issued by a manager, file access 
permissions issued by a file’s owner. The whole data construct is digitally signed by 
the AA, thereby providing data integrity and authentication of the issuer. 
 
The attributes are 
embedded within the 
Attribute Certificate 
Information data 
construct (see Figure 
2). This contains 
details of the holder, 
the issuer, the 
algorithms used in 
creating the signature 
on the AC, the AC 
validity time and 
various optional 
extensions. Anyone 
familiar with the contents of an X.509 public key certificate (PKC) will immediately 
see the similarities between a PKC and an AC. In essence the public key of a PKC has 
been replaced by a set of attributes. (In this respect a public key certificate can be seen 
to be a specialisation of a more general attribute certificate.)  Because the AC is 
digitally signed by the issuer, then any process in possession of an AC can check its 
integrity by checking the digital signature on the AC. Thus a PMI builds upon and 
complements existing PKIs. 
 
Since a PMI is to authorisation what a PKI is to authentication, there are many other 
similar concepts between PKIs and PMIs. Whilst public key certificates are used to 
maintain a strong binding between a user’s name and his public key, an attribute 
certificate (AC) maintains a strong binding between a user’s name and one or more 
privilege attributes. The entity that digitally signs a public key certificate is called a 
Certification Authority (CA), whilst the entity that signs an attribute certificate is 
called an Attribute Authority (AA). Within a PKI, each relying party must have one or 
more roots of trust. These are CAs who the relying party implicitly trusts to 
 
Attribute Certificate Info ::= SEQUENCE { 
  version  AttCertVersion,   
  holder   Holder, 
  issuer   Issuer, 
  signature  AlgorithmIdentifier,   
  attrCertValidityPeriod AttCertValidityPeriod,   
  attributes  SEQUENCE of Attribute,   




Extensions OPTIONAL }   
Figure 2 Attribute Certificate Info 
 3
authenticate other entities. They are sometimes called root CAs1 or trust anchors. 
Popular Web browsers come pre-configured with over 50 PKI roots of trust. The root 
of trust of a PMI is called the Source of Authority (SOA).  This is an entity that a 
resource implicity trusts to allocate privileges and access rights to it. The SOA is 
ultimately responsible for issuing ACs to trusted holders, and these can be either end 
users or subordinate AAs. Just as CAs may have subordinate CAs to which they 
delegate the powers of authentication and certification, similarly, SOAs may have 
subordinate AAs to which they delegate their powers of authorisation and attribute 
assigning. For example, in an organisation the Finance Director might be the SOA for 
allocating the privilege of spending company money. But (s)he might also delegate 
this privilege to departmental managers (subordinate AAs) who can then allocate 
specific spending privileges (ACs) to project leaders.  
 
When a problem occurs in a PKI, a user might need to have his signing key revoked, 
and so a CA might issue a certificate revocation list (CRL) containing the list of PKCs 
no longer to be trusted. Similarly if a PMI user needs to have his authorisation 
permissions revoked, an AA may issue an attribute certificate revocation list (ACRL) 
containing the list of ACs no longer to be trusted. The similarities between PKIs and 
PMIs are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Concept PKI entity PMI entity 
Certificate Public Key Certificate (PKC) Attribute Certificate (AC) 
Certificate issuer Certification Authority (CA) Attribute Authority (AA) 
Certificate user Subject Holder 
Certificate binding Subject’s Name to Public 
Key 
Holder’s Name to 
Privilege Attribute(s) 
Revocation Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) 
Attribute Certificate 
Revocation List (ACRL) 
Root of trust Root Certification Authority 
or Trust Anchor 
Source of Authority 
(SOA) 
Subordinate authority Subordinate Certification 
Authority 
Attribute Authority (AA) 
Table 1. A Comparison of PKIs and PMIs 
 
Further details about X.509 PMIs can be found in [17]. 
Implementing RBAC with X.509 
Recent research has focussed on Role Based Access Controls (RBAC) [22] [11], 
culminating in the publication of RBAC as an American National Standard (ANSI 
INCITS 359-2004) in February 2004. In the basic RBAC model, a number of roles are 
defined. These roles typically represent organisational roles such as secretary, 
manager, employee etc. In the authorisation policy, each role is given a set of 
permissions i.e. the ability to perform certain actions on certain targets. Each user is 
then assigned to one or more roles. When accessing a target, a user presents his 
role(s), and the target reads the policy to see if this role is allowed to perform this 
action. RBAC has the advantage of scalability over traditional discretionary access 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately early versions of X.509 did not standardise the term root CA or any term for the root of 
trust. Because of this, disparate meanings for the term “root CA” have now evolved. 
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control (DAC) schemes such as access control lists (ACLs), and can easily handle 
large numbers of users as there are typically far fewer roles than users.  
 
X.509 supports simple RBAC by defining role specification attribute certificates that 
hold the permissions granted to each role, and role assignment attribute certificates 
that assign various roles to the users. In the former case, the AC holder is the role, and 
the privilege attributes are permissions granted to the role. In the latter case the AC 
holder is the user, and the privilege attributes are the roles assigned to the user.  
 
The hierarchical RBAC model is a more sophisticated version of the basic RBAC 
model. With this model, the roles are organised hierarchically, and the senior roles 
inherit the privileges of the more junior roles. So for example we might have the 
following hierarchy: 
employee > programmer > manager > director.  
If a privilege is given to an employee role e.g. can enter main building, then each of 
the superior roles can also enter the main building even though their role specification 
does not explicitly state this. If a programmer is given permission to enter the 
computer building, then managers and directors would also inherit this permission. 
Hierarchical roles mean that role specifications are more compact. X.509 supports 
hierarchical RBAC by allowing both roles and privileges to be inserted as attributes in 
a role specification attribute certificate, so that the latter role inherits the privileges of 
the encapsulated roles. 
 
Another extension to basic RBAC is constrained RBAC. This allows various 
constraints to be applied to the role and permission assignments. One common 
constraint is that certain roles are declared to be mutually exclusive, meaning that the 
same person cannot simultaneously hold more than one role from the mutually 
exclusive set. For example, the roles of student and examiner, or the roles of tenderer 
(one who submits a tender) and tender officer (one who opens submitted tenders) 
would both be examples of mutually exclusive sets. Another constraint might be 
placed on the number of roles a person can hold, or the number of people who can 
hold a particular role. X.509 only has a limited number of ways of supporting 
constrained RBAC. Time constraints can be placed on the validity period of a role 
assignment attribute certificate. Constraints can be placed on the targets at which a 
role can be used, and on the policies under which an attribute certificate can confer 
privileges.  Constraints can also be placed on the delegation of roles. However many 
of the constraints, such as the mutual exclusivity of roles, have to be enforced by 
mechanisms outside the attribute certificate construct e.g. within the policy 
enforcement function.  
 
Of course, every target that relies on X.509 ACs to confer privileges, also needs to be 
configured with a policy, or a set of rules, that will tell it which access methods are to 
be granted by which privileges. Unfortunately X.509 does not standardise any type of 
policy and leaves this up to the applications using the X.509 PMI. This is one of the 
biggest challenges for anyone deciding to build an X.509 PMI. 
The PERMIS PMI Architecture 
The PERMIS PMI is, according to Blaze’s definition in RFC 2704 [3], a trust 
management system. Consequently it must have the following five components: 
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i) A language for describing `actions', which are operations with security 
consequences that are to be controlled by the system. 
ii) A mechanism for identifying `principals', which are entities that can be 
authorized to perform actions. 
iii) A language for specifying application `policies', which govern the actions 
that principals are authorized to perform. 
iv) A language for specifying `credentials', which allow principals to delegate 
authorization to other principals. 
v) A `compliance checker', which provides a service to applications for 
determining how an action requested by principals should be handled, 
given a policy and a set of credentials. 
X.509 attribute certificates specify mechanisms for ii) and iv). Principals are the 
holders and issuers of ACs and can be identified by their X.500 General Name 
(usually an X.500/LDAP distinguished name (DN) [16], IP address, URI or email 
address) or by reference to their public key certificate (issuer name and serial number) 
or if the principal is a software object by a hash of itself. Credentials are specified as 
X.500 attributes, which comprise an attribute type and value. Defining the policy (iii) 
and action (i) languages were significant tasks of the PERMIS project [5], as was 
building a privilege allocation subsystem that creates X.509 ACs, and a compliance 
checker (v)  that validates them.  
Defining the Policy Language 
The authorisation policy needs to specify who is to be granted which roles, and what 
types of action on which targets are to be granted to the roles (optionally under which 
conditions). Domain wide policy authorisation is far more preferable than having 
separate access control lists configured into each target. The latter is hard to manage, 
duplicates the effort of the administrators (since the task has to be repeated for each 
target), and is less secure since it is very difficult to keep track of which access rights 
any particular user has across the whole domain. Policy based authorisation on the 
other hand allows the domain administrator (the SOA) to specify the authorisation 
policy for the whole domain, and all targets will then be controlled by the same set of 
rules.  
 
Significant research has already taken place in defining authorisation policy 
languages. The Ponder language [7] is very compact and very powerful, but does not 
have a large set of supporting tools. The Keynote policy language [3] is also very 
comprehensive and covers many of our requirements, but is focussed on DAC rather 
than RBAC. Also, the policy assertions are very generic and are not related 
specifically to X.509. For example, the authoriser and licensees fields are opaque 
strings whereas we wanted them to have structure and meaning. Further, it does not 
seem to be possible to control the depth of delegation allowed from one authoriser to a 
subordinate. Finally, the syntax, comprising of ASCII strings and keywords, is 
specific to Keynote. The PERMIS project wanted to specify the authorisation policy 
in a well-known language that could be both easily parsed by computers, and read by 
the SOAs (with or without software tools). We decided that XML was a good 
candidate for a policy specification language, since there are lots of tools around that 
support XML, it is fast becoming an industry standard, and raw XML can be read and 
understood by many technical people. Shortly after we started our work, Bertino et al 
published a paper [2] that showed that XML was indeed suitable for specifying 
authorisation policies. Later, the OASIS consortium began work on the eXtensible 
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Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [18], and this is now an OASIS 
standard for specifying policies. 
 
We needed a language tailored to X.509 and RBAC, so we specified a Data Type 
Definition (DTD)2 for our X.500 PMI RBAC Policy. The DTD is a meta-language 
that holds the rules for creating the XML policies. Our DTD comprises the following 
components: 
- RBAC Policy – this specifies the unique number for the policy, using a globally 
unique Object Identifiers (OID) 
- SubjectPolicy – this specifies the subject domains i.e. only users from a subject 
domain may be authorised to access resources covered by the policy 
- RoleHierarchyPolicy – this specifies the different roles and their hierarchical 
relationships to each other 
- SOAPolicy – this specifies which SOAs are trusted to allocate roles. By including 
more than one SOA in this policy, the local SOA is effectively cross certifying 
remote authorisation domains 
- RoleAssignmentPolicy – this specifies which roles may be allocated to which 
subjects by which SOAs, whether delegation of roles may take place or not, and 
how long the roles may be assigned for 
- TargetPolicy – this specifies the target domains covered by this policy 
- ActionPolicy – this specifies the actions (or methods) supported by the targets, 
along with the parameters that should be passed along with each action e.g. action 
Open with parameter Filename 
- TargetAccessPolicy – this specifies which roles have permission to perform which 
actions on which targets, and under which conditions. Conditions are specified 
using Boolean logic and might contain constraints such as “IF time is GT 9am 
AND time is LT 5pm OR IF Calling IP address is a subset of 125.67.x.x”. All 
actions that are not specified in a Target Access Policy are denied. 
 
A full description of the PERMIS X.500 PMI RBAC policy can be found in [4]. The 
policy DTD has been published by XML.ORG (http://www.xml.org) and is also 
available from our web site at http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk/permis/Policy.dtd. 
 
                                                 
2 We used a DTD rather than an XML schema, since XML schemas were still under development when 
we started our work, and few tools were available to support schemas. We are currently migrating 
towards the use of an XML schema. 
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<!ELEMENT RoleAssignmentPolicy (RoleAssignment)+ > 
<!ELEMENT RoleAssignment  (SubjectDomain,Role,Delegate,SOA,Validity) > 
 
<!ELEMENT SubjectDomain EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST SubjectDomain ID IDREF #REQUIRED> 
 
<!ELEMENT Role EMPTY > 
<!ATTLIST Role Type IDREF #IMPLIED  
               Value IDREF #IMPLIED > 
 
<!ELEMENT SOA EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST SOA ID IDREF #REQUIRED> 
 
<!ELEMENT Validity (Absolute?, Maximum?, Minimum? ) > 
<!ELEMENT Absolute EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST Absolute Start CDATA #IMPLIED 
                   End CDATA #IMPLIED > 
<!ELEMENT Maximum EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST Maximum Time CDATA #IMPLIED > 
<!ELEMENT Minimum EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST Minimum Time CDATA #IMPLIED > 
 
<!ELEMENT Delegate EMPTY > 
<!ATTLIST Delegate Depth CDATA #IMPLIED > 
 
Table 2. The Role Assignment DTD  
 
Table 2 shows a portion of the DTD that specifies the rules for the Role Assignment 
Policy, and Table 3 it is an example Role Assignment Policy for an electronic 





    <RoleAssignment> 
<!-- Role assignment for tender officers. 
They must be employees of Salford City Council.  Valid only from close of tender.  
Delegation not permitted --> 
 <SubjectDomain ID="Employees"/> 
      <Role Type="permisRole" Value="TenderOfficer"/> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="Salford"/> 
      <Validity> 
        <Absolute Start="2001-09-21T17:00:00"/> 
      </Validity> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
<!-- Role assignment for tenderers. 
They must be dot com or co.uk companies.  Valid only until close of tender. 
Delegation not permitted --> 
 <SubjectDomain ID="Companies"/> 
      <Role Type="permisRole" Value="Tenderer"/> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="Salford"/> 
      <Validity> 
        <Absolute End="2001-09-21T17:00:00"/> 
      </Validity> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
    <RoleAssignment> 
<!-- Role assignment for companies who are ISO9000 Certified. 
They must be dot com or co.uk companies.  Valid only for a maximum of one year, as 
companies have to be annually re-accredited. Certificates are issued by BSI. 
Delegation not permitted --> 
 <SubjectDomain ID="Companies"/> 
      <Role Type="ISOCertified" Value="ISO9000"/> 
      <Delegate Depth="0"/> 
      <SOA ID="BSI"/> 
      <Validity> 
        <Maximum Time="+01"/> 
      </Validity> 
    </RoleAssignment> 
</RoleAssignmentPolicy>  
Table 3. An Example Role Assignment Policy 
 
The SOA creates the XML authorisation policy for the target domain and stores this 
in a local file, say MyPolicy.XML. This will be used later by the Privilege Allocator 
tool to create the policy AC. However, creating XML files using generic XML editors 
such as IBM’s Xeena, or text editors such as Notepad, is not intuitively easy, 
especially for non-technical managers. Consequently we are currently working on a 
joint project between the University of Salford and UCL to create a user-friendly 
graphical interface (GUI) to allow non-technical managers to easily create PERMIS 




Figure 3. A screenshot from the PERMIS Policy Management GUI tool 
 
Storing the policy 
Policies are stored as digitally-signed authorisation policies, in a X.509 policy ACs. 
The policy AC is a standard X.509 AC with the following special characteristics: the 
holder and issuer names are the same (i.e. that of the policy issuer SOA), the attribute 
type is pmiXMLPolicy and the attribute value is the XML policy created as described 
above. The policy AC is signed by the root of trust of the PMI, and is similar to the 
self-signed public key certificate of the root CA of a PKI.  Policy ACs are created 
using the Privilege Allocator (PA) tool (see later). The PA prompts the SOA for the 
name of the policy file (e.g. MyPolicy.XML) and then it copies the contents into the 
attribute value. After the SOA has signed the policy AC, the PA stores it in the SOA’s 
entry in the LDAP directory. Each authorisation policy is given an Object Identifier 
[13], which is a globally unique number. This ensures that the PERMIS API (see 
later) always runs with the correct policy for the domain. 
Role Assignment 
A role in PERMIS is simply defined as an attribute type and value. We usually use the 
attribute type permisRole whose values are IA5 strings. Administrators (SOAs or 
AAs) can then put any value in the IA5 string to identify a specific role. Note however 
that there will have to be negotiation between the role allocating SOAs and the target 
 10
site SOA to ensure they use exactly the same attributes for the same roles. This is one 
reason that the Internet2 consortium has defined the EduPerson LDAP object class 
[23], so that all universities can use the same attribute types and values to mean the 
same things. 
 
PERMIS provides two tools for assigning roles to individuals: the Privilege 
Allocation (PA) graphical user interface tool, and the bulk loader tool. The PA allows 
an administrator (SOA or AA) to assign one or more attributes (roles) to an 
individual, to digitally sign the encompassing AC, and then store the AC in the user’s 
entry in an LDAP directory (see Figure 4). The bulk loader comprises a Java API and 
a sample program which searches an LDAP directory for entries that have a particular 
object class. For each retrieved LDAP entry, the sample program assigns a particular 
attribute to its Distinguished Name (DN), then calls the Java API which embeds the 
attribute in an X.509 AC, signs the AC using the private key of the SOA, and stores 
the AC in the entry of the given DN. In this way every person, e.g. student, manager, 
accountant etc. can be automatically assigned different role ACs. 
 
In real life, role assignment can only be done by an authorised person. For example, 
allocating the role of professor to an academic may be decided by a university 
appointment’s panel and the chair of the panel may inform the Registrar’s department 
to assign the role to a particular individual.  In the electronic world, the Registrar 
would need to issue and digitally sign an X.509 AC to the individual containing the 
professor role attribute. Within a university department, the head of school may assign 
the role Undergraduate Course Leader to a member of staff, and similarly issue an 
X.509 AC to this individual. The X.509 AC always provides the name of the 
assigning person (the AA), and this is bound to the AC through his/her digital 
signature, thus X.509 ACs cannot easily be forged. 
 
In PERMIS, anyone is allowed to run the PA or bulk loader tools, i.e. to issue role 
ACs, but only authorised individuals will be trusted by the PERMIS decision engine, 
according to the PERMIS trust model (see later). Since all the ACs are digitally 
signed by their assigning authorities, the PERMIS decision engine can easily 
determine trusted ACs from non-trusted ACs. Since ACs are digitally signed by the 
AA which issued them, they are tamper-resistant, and therefore there is no 
modification risk from allowing them to be stored in a publicly accessible LDAP 
directory. This also means that authorities who issue digital ACs can store them 
locally, but give global access to them (just as they might for X.509 public key 
certificates). 
 
The attribute certificate revocation lists (ACRLs) of revoked certificates (if any), also 
need to be stored in a publicly accessible place, such as the local LDAP directory, so 
that relying parties can have easy access to them. Thus there is little advantage in 
general of distributing the ACs to their holders, rather than keeping them centrally 
stored in an LDAP directory, since a relying party will still need to access the issuing 
authorities LDAP directory in order to retrieve the latest ACRL. On the other hand, if 
the ACs are not distributed to their holders, but are retained in the local LDAP 
directory, then there is no need for ACRLs to be issued, since the administrator 
simply needs to delete a user’s ACs from their entry in order to “revoke” the AC. We 
thus believe that the so called “pull” model for AC retrieval [10], where ACs are 
fetched by PERMIS from various LDAP directories, rather than the user pushing them 
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to PERMIS from his PC, is the simplest model for managing ACs, and the most 
efficient for decision making, since ACRLs are not needed. 
 
As can be seen, the PERMIS infrastructure supports distributed authorisation 
management, in which different sites can run the PA and/or bulk loader tools and 
allocate ACs to their users and store them in their local LDAP directories. This will 
significantly ease the management of privileges in large distributed environments, 
such as GRID networks, Internet marketplaces etc, as the policy governing access to 
target resources only needs to tell the PERMIS API which LDAP directories to 
contact and which remote SOAs to trust. 
 
We see that this mechanism can be extended to any type of attribute or role 
certification e.g. Microsoft Certified Engineer, BSc (Hons) University of Salford etc. 
and that these “roles” can easily be built into PERMIS via the authorisation policy. 
We have already used this mechanism in an electronic prescribing system that we 
built [9], to allow the Royal College of Pharmacy to allocate pharmacist roles to 
qualified pharmacists, and the General Medical Council to allocate doctor roles to 
qualified doctors. 
 
Figure 4. The Privilege Allocation GUI Tool 
The PERMIS Decision Engine 
An application gateway (see Figure 5) is responsible for authenticating and 
authorising remote users and providing access to targets. The ISO 10181-3 Access 
Control Framework [15], splits the functionality of the application gateway into two 
components: an application-specific component termed the Access Control 
Enforcement Function (AEF), and an application-independent component termed the 
Access Control Decision Function (ADF). In this way, all access controls decisions in 
a domain can be consistently enforced by the ADF independent of the application. 
The ADF makes its decisions based on the authorisation policy for the domain, on 
who is initiating a request, what action is being requested on which target, and 
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environmental factors such as the time of day. The PERMIS decision engine is an 
implementation of an ADF. 
 
The AEF and ADF can be interconnected via either a local application programmable 
interface (API) for local invocation, or via a communications protocol for remote 
invocation. 
 
An API between the AEF and ADF has already been defined by the Open Group. It is 
called the AZN API [19], and is specified in the C language. A similar API is also 
being developed by the IETF, called the Generic Authorization and Access control 
(GAA) API [21]. PERMIS has drawn on the work of the Open Group in order to 
specify the PERMIS API in Java. This is described in the following section. 
 
ADF



















Figure 5. The PERMIS Application Gateway 
 
The OASIS group has defined the SAML protocol [6] as a standard protocol for 
invoking authorisation decision requests from a remote ADF service. In 2003 we 
started to work with the Global Grid Forum to produce a profile of SAML for use by 
Grid applications. This profile [8] has in fact identified a number of deficiencies in the 
standard SAMLv1.1 protocol, and has defined a few extensions to it. The resulting 
protocol has now been implemented by PERMIS, and this will allow the PERMIS 
ADF to run as a stand-alone service. The protocol is also shortly to be incorporated 
into Globus Toolkit V3, thus allowing grid applications to invoke PERMIS to make 
authorisation decisions on its behalf.  
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User Authentication 
In order to get through the application gateway, each user needs to be issued with an 
application specific authentication token acceptable to the gateway. If a PKI is being 
used, this will be a digitally signed public key certificate. If a conventional 
authentication system is being used it will be a username/password pair. Alternatively, 
the application gateway may support Kerberos authentication, one-time password 
authentication, biometric authentication or any other scheme. The PERMIS API has 
been designed to be authentication agnostic. PERMIS simply trusts the calling 
application gateway to have performed authentication of the user to its own 
satisfaction. All that PERMIS requires is that the application gateway pass to 
PERMIS the authenticated LDAP DN of the user. PERMIS will then use this to 
retrieve the user’s X.509 ACs, on which to make its authorisation decisions. 
 
To summarise, in the PERMIS model, a user accesses resources via an application 
gateway. The AEF authenticates the user in an application specific way, then asks the 
PERMIS ADF if the user is allowed to perform the requested action on the particular 
target resource. The PERMIS ADF accesses one or more LDAP directories to retrieve 
the policy AC and the role ACs for the user, and bases its decision on these. If the 
decision is grant, the AEF will access the target on behalf of the user. If the decision 
is deny, the AEF will refuse access to the user. The AEF talks to the PERMIS ADF 
via either the PERMIS Java API or the GGF SAML protocol. 
The PERMIS Java API 
The PERMIS Java API comprises 2 simple methods: GetCreds, and Decision, and a 
Constructor. The Constructor builds the PERMIS API Java object. For construction, 
the AEF passes the name of the SOA (the root of trust for target authorisation), the 
Object Identifier of the policy to be used, and a list of LDAP URIs from where the 
ADF can retrieve the policy AC and subsequently the role ACs. The policy AC is 
always retrieved from the SOA’s entry in the LDAP directory pointed to by the first 
URI in the list. The Constructor is usually called just once, whilst the AEF starts up. 
After construction of the API has completed, the PERMIS ADF will have read in and 
validated the XML of the authorisation policy that will control all future decisions that 
it makes.  
 
When a user initiates a call to the target, the AEF authenticates the user, then passes 
the LDAP DN [16] of the user to the PERMIS ADF through a call to GetCreds. In 
pilot services users have been authenticated in different ways. In an e-tendering 
application, the user sent an S/MIME email message to the AEF; in an e-planning 
application, the user opened an SSL connection using an X.509 client certificate.  
 
In all cases the authentication yielded the user’s LDAP DN. The PERMIS ADF uses 
this DN to retrieve all the role ACs of the user from the list of LDAP URIs passed at 
initialisation time (this is termed the “pull” model [10]). The role ACs are validated 
against the policy e.g. to check that the DN is within a valid subject domain, and to 
check that the ACs are within the validity time of the policy etc. Invalid role ACs are 
discarded, whilst the roles from the valid ACs are extracted and kept for the user, and 
returned to the AEF as a subject object. (The GetCreds interface also supports the 
“push” model [10] (called user-pull by Park et al [20]), whereby the AEF can push a 
set of ACs to the ADF, instead of the ADF pulling them from the LDAP directories, 
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but since our ADF currently does not retrieve ACRLs, this mechanism is unused at 
present). 
 
Once the user has been successfully authenticated he will attempt to perform certain 
actions on the target. At each attempt, the AEF passes the subject object, the target 
name, and the attempted action along with its parameters, to the PERMIS ADF via a 
call to Decision. Decision checks if the action is allowed for the roles that the user 
has, taking into account all the conditions specified in the TargetAccessPolicy. If the 
action is allowed, Decision returns Granted, if it is not allowed it returns Denied. The 
user may attempt an arbitrary number of actions on different targets, and Decision is 
called for each one. In order to stop the user keeping the connection open for an 
infinite amount of time (for example until after his ACs have expired), the PERMIS 
API supports the concept of a session time out. On the call to GetCreds the AEF can 
say how long the session may stay open before the credentials should be refreshed. If 
the session times out, then Decision will throw an exception, telling the AEF to either 
close the user’s connection or call GetCreds again. 
 
The AEF can stop using a particular ADF at any time, for example if circumstances 
dictate that the authorisation policy should be changed. If the AEF invokes a new 
PERMIS ADF constructor, standard Java garbage collection will delete the old ADF. 
This can happen, say, if the SOA wants to dynamically impose a new authorisation 
policy on the domain. The AEF can invoke a new Constructor call, and this will cause 
the ADF to read in the latest authorisation policy and be ready to make access control 
decisions again based on this. 
The PERMIS Trust Model 
The PERMIS trust model has a single trusted root of authority, from which all other 
trust is inherited. When the PERMIS ADF is initialised, it is passed the name of the 
SOA for the target (the root of trust), the unique OID of the policy to use, and a list of 
LDAP URIs to access. This allows the PERMIS ADF to fetch the policy AC from the 
SOA’s entry stored in the LDAP directory pointed to by the first LDAP URI in the 
list. PERMIS checks the digital signature on this policy AC, and if it does not 
correspond to that of the SOA, then the policy is not to be trusted and it is discarded. 
If the policy AC has been signed by the SOA, then it is trusted, and its embedded 
unique OID is compared to that passed at initialisation time. If they are the same, this 
confirms that the correct policy is being used. 
 
Inside the policy is the SOAPolicy. This gives a list of remote SOAs and AAs to be 
trusted to allocate role ACs to users. Further, the RoleAssignmentPolicy states which 
attributes/roles these SOAs and AAs are trusted to issue. Attributes not in this policy 
will be discarded by PERMIS at decision time. Also the RoleAssignmentPolicy says 
which subjects these attributes can be assigned to. This ensures that remote SOAs do 
not allocate roles to wrong groups of users. However, the remote SOAs are trusted to, 
and expected to, authenticate the subjects prior to issuing them with role ACs. In this 
way the PERMIS ADF can be assured that all the roles it uses in its decision making 
have been assigned according to the policy, and are trusted. 
 
Finally, the policy AC says what access rights are given to each role. The PERMIS 




We have shown how the standard X.509 PMI can be adapted to build an efficient role 
based trust management system, in which the role assignments can be widely 
distributed between organisations, and the local authorisation policy determines which 
roles are trusted and what privileges are to be given to them. The PERMIS 
authorisation policy governs all aspects of access to the targets in the local domain. 
The PERMIS authorisation policy is written in XML and the DTD has been published 
by XML.ORG. A user friendly policy management GUI is being built that will allow 
non-technical managers to easily create PERMIS policies. 
 
PERMIS provides an authorisation decision engine which determines which users are 
allowed to perform which actions, based on the authorisation policy and the X.509 
role ACs allocated to the users. Two tools are provided for allocating role ACs and 
storing them in LDAP directories: a graphical Privilege Allocator tool and a bulk 
loading tool. 
 
A simple Java API and SAML interface are provided which allow applications to 
easily incorporate the PERMIS decision engine as either their local or remote 
authorisation decision making machine. A public release of PERMIS is available for 
educational and research use from our web site (http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk/permis. 
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